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Command. McFarland & Company, Inc., $32.00 ISBN 978-0-7864-5960-5
Shedding New Light on a Political General
The Civil War made heroes and legends of many men, particularly from
Illinois. John A. McClernand is rarely, if ever, listed among that group.
Christopher Meyers’ recent study seeks to explain why by providing a
matter-of-fact narrative tracing McClernand’s steady rise through the Illinois
politics and his precipitous fall in the military ranks. Meyers’ determines that
McClernand’s connections with the Democratic Party, as well as with Lincoln,
and his public popularity as a congressman had positioned McClernand for a
place among the pantheon of the war’s greatest leaders in April 1861. Yet,
McClernand’s heightened wartime ambitions and insubordination tarnished his
reputation and thus, relegated him to obscurity.
Meyers presents McClernand as a key antebellum operative of the Illinois
Democratic Party, skillfully working behind the scenes to promote
conservative/moderate solutions to the country’s sectional strife, most notably
popular sovereignty. He also served as a Springfield lawyer and state legislator
working alongside the Herndon brothers and Abraham Lincoln. McClernand
maneuvered through the turmoil of the 1850s to become an influential
congressman and Democratic kingmaker, rising as Stephen Douglas’s champion.
Following Lincoln’s ascension to the presidency, McClernand determined to
stay with the Union as the South seceded, and he emerged as the consummate
political general. Lincoln appointed U.S. Grant and McClernand as general
officers and stationed them in the western theater. By enlisting northern
Democrats like McClernand, the president hoped that moderate southerners and
his northern critics would fall in line with his plan to restore the Union.
McClernand intended to use his experience on the western rivers and high-level
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political connections to secure support for his schemes to conquer the
Confederacy, earning laurels that he would cash in later for political glory.
However, he overplayed his personal relationship with Lincoln and quickly
found himself at odds with many of the professional soldiers, including Grant
and William T. Sherman. McClernand frequently circumvented the West Point
clique by contacting the White House directly with strategic suggestions and
field reports highly critical of Grant, David Dixon Porter, and Henry Halleck.
Although a competent commander, McClernand’s political ambition
undermined his military legacy. Lincoln’s careful massaging of McClernand’s
ego during the war’s early campaigns in Tennessee perhaps encouraged the
general to behave in an increasingly insubordinate manner, but these episodes
also revealed that McClernand made little or no distinction between the political
arena and the battlefield. That would be his undoing. The era of the political
general was rapidly fading as the professional soldiers asserted their control over
military affairs. After McClernand’s impolitic machinations during the
Vicksburg campaign, Lincoln accepted Grant’s request to reassign McClernand
to the Department of the Gulf where the general battled little except frustration
and illness.
Meyers concludes that McClernand’s leading nemesis, Grant, was not only a
better commander, he was also a better politician, saying that Grant understood
that removing political generals without sufficient cause would damage the
delicate political situation and his growing credibility with Lincoln. Meyers’
impressive research into McClernand’s military and private correspondence
allows for an excellent analysis of McClernand’s immature strategic
understanding of the war and his failure to grasp the political situation within the
military command structure. It also makes very clear why McClernand generated
such intense animosity among his superiors for ignoring the chain of command
and acts of insubordination with his diatribes to Washington. Meyers argues that
McClernand must be remembered as an artful antebellum politician, as well as a
dutiful and competent commander who served in the shadow of Illinois’ most
famous sons, but who let political ambition thwart his own expectations.
Derek W. Frisby is an assistant professor of history at Middle Tennessee
State University. He is currently preparing a manuscript examining southern
Unionism in West Tennessee for publication. dfrisby@mtsu.edu
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